Chris William Sanchirico earned a A.B. from Princeton in 1984, a J.D. from Yale in 1994, and a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale in 1994.He was an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics of Columbia University from 1995 to 1999 before joining the faculty at UVA law. The courses he has taught include The Taxation of Business Entities, International Taxation, Federal Income Tax, Tax Policy, Evidence, and Civil Procedure. Among his research interests are Tax Policy, Distributive Justice, Evidentiary Procedure, Social Norms, Game Theory, and Probability Theory. He is now a Professor of Law at Penn and Co-Director of the Center for Tax Law and Policy. He has served as a Founding Editor, Economic Inequality and the Law Abstracts (Social Science Research Service); Founding Editor, Evidence and Evidentiary Procedure Abstracts (Social Science Research Service); Member of the Board of Directors, American Law and Economics Association; Chair, Evidence Section, Association of American Law Schools; Editorial/Advisory Board Member, Law, Norms, and Information (Social Science Research Service), Review of Law and Economics (Berkeley Electronic Press), and International Commentary on Evidence (Berkeley Electronic Press).
The Role of Absolute Continuity in “Merging of Opinions” and “Rational Learning,” 29 Games & Econ. Behav. 170-190 (1999).
Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm (with Alexander S. P. Pfaff), 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 189-208 (2000).
Games, Information, and Evidence Production: with Application to English Legal History, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 342-380 (2000).
Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797-820 (2000).
Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1227-1311 (2001).
Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2027-2062 (2001).
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003-1089 (2001).
Relying upon the Information of Interested – and Potentially Dishonest – Parties, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 320-355 (2001).